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COMMENTS 
CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, 
INC. v. CITY OF HIALEAH: A READER'S 
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY FREE 
EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE 
RIGHT TO PERFORM RITUAL ANIMAL 
SACRIFICE 
"No chapter in human history has been so largely 
written in terms of persecution and intolerance as 
the ones dealing with religious freedom."l 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's traditional free exercise jurisprudence 
has recognized a meaningful distinction between religious beliefs 
and religious conduct for more than a century.2 In Cantwell u. 
Connecticut,3 for example, Justice Roberts explained that the 
First Amendment "embraces two concepts - freedom to believe 
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be.'" Thus, while the Court has con-
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 175 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
2. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Congress was de-
prived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions .... "). 
This distinction is not, of course, unique to the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. The 
Court has similarly recognized a meaningful distinction between "pure speech" and "ex-
pressive conduct." See generally United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313-18 (1990) 
(holding that flag burning is protected expression); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-
06 (1988) (also holding that flag burning is protected expression); Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (holding that affixing peace symbol to flag is protected ex-
pression); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that burning draft 
card is unprotected conduct). 
3. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
4. [d. at 303. 
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sistently held that the First Amendment flatly prohibits laws 
regulating religious beliefs, II it is well settled that the Free Exer-
cise Clause6 will tolerate some restrictions on religious conduct.7 
5. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 
U.S. 913 (1990) ("The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to 
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 699 (1986) ("the freedom of individual belief ... is absolute"); Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983) ("This Court has long held the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment an absolute prohibition against governmental regulation 
of religious beliefs."); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) ("The Free Exercise 
Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding reli-
gious beliefs as such."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The door to the 
Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against government regulation of religious be-
liefs as such."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("The freedom to hold 
religious beliefs and opinions is absolute."); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 ("Freedom of con-
, science and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the 
individual may chose cannot be restricted by law."). 
"Religion" does not appear to be subject to a single definitive meaning. The Court 
has explained that "[tlhe term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to 
his Creator, and to the .obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, 
and of obedience to his will." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). And the'Court 
has held that beliefs are adequately religious even if they are not "acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible." Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). But 
few decisions have been addressed specifically to this concern. For an example of one 
such decision, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (Maryland law requiring 
applicants for public office to declare belief in God invalid). Courts have rather focused 
mainly on whether putative religious beliefs are sincerely held. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715 
("review in this context is limited to determining whether the plaintiff's convictions are 
honest"). The scope of the free exercise clause is not, however, unlimited. In Thomas, 
the Court suggested that some claims might be "so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as 
.not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause." [d. Secular beliefs, 
whether "sincere and conscientious," similarly will not suffice. Michael W. McConnel, 
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1409, 1417 (1990) [hereinafter McConnel, "Origins of Free Exercise"l. 
6. The free exercise clause commands that "Congress shall make no law ... prohib-
iting the free exercise [of religionl." U.S. CONST. amend 1. The amendment is similarly 
binding against the States. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. 
7. See, e.g., Roy, 476 U.S. at 699 ("[Tlhe freedom of individual conduct ... is not 
absolute."); Brown, 366 U.S. at 603 ("[Tlhe freedom to act, even when the action is in 
accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions."); 
see also Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 603; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78 ("It would doubtless be unconsti-
tutional ... to ban the casting of 'statutes that are to be used for worship purposes,' or 
to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf."). 
While widely accepted, the belief-action distinction is not without its critics. One 
commentator suggests that "[ilt appears to be somewhat incongruous to make such a . 
distinction when the first amendment speaks in terms of protecting the exercise of reli-
gion, not simply beliefs held under the religion." Paul Marcus, The Forum of Con-
science: Applying Standards Under The Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 
1234 (emphasis origina\); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("Because the First Amendment does not distinguish between religious beliefs and reli-
gious conduct, conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must be 
2
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Indeed, as long ago as 1878, the Court rejected a free exercise 
challenge, addressed to a federal law making bigamy a crime.8 
Justice Roberts' Cantwell opinion highlights the significance 
of the belief-conduct distinction. Today, however, in the wake of 
the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,9 this dis-
tinction has assumed additional importance. Generally speaking, 
before Smith, laws imposing a substantial burden10 on the free 
exercise of religious conduct had to be justified by a compelling 
interest. ll But Smith, insulating neutral generally applicable 
regulations from even minimal scrutiny,12 raises serious concern 
for whether the Court will continue to conduct any form of 
meaningful review. Precisely because the Court will now have to 
confront its Smith decision in Church of The Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,13 Hialeah may be the most impor-
at least presumptively protected by the Free Exercise Clause."). History 'would appear to 
support this interpretation. The amendment originally referred to the "rights of con-
science" rather than the "free exercise of religion." McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, 
supra note 5, at 1488. Professor McConnel, in explaining the significance of differences 
between these terms, suggests that "[t]he least ambiguous difference is that the term 
'free exercise' makes clear that the clause protects religiously motivated conduct as well 
as belief." Id. 
8. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). 
10. To establish a cognizable free exercise claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the challenged government action burdens the free exercise of religion. See infra notes 
184-95 and accompanying text discussing the cognizable burden requirement. 
11. See infra Section IV discussing the Court's free exercise jurisprudence prior to 
Smith. For the purpose of free exercise review, the Court has adopted various formula-
tions of the compelling interest test. See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58 ("The State may 
justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an 
overriding governmental interest."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) 
("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbal-
ance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (inter-
ference with religious liberty must be justified by a "compelling state interest"); see also 
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989), reh'g denied, 
492 U.S. 933 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 141 
(1987). Essentially though, the basic framework of free exercise doctrine is easily stated. 
Once the plaintiff demonstrates that government activity imposes a cognizable burden 
on religious exercise, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the activity is the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling secular interest. Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Government must carry the burden to show that an exemp-
tion "will not unduly interfere with fulfillment of [its] interest."). While the test is usu-
ally stringent, it has not always been fatal to legislation. See, e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258 
(nationwide interest in social security system compelling); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 
595 (state's interest in eradicating racial discrimination compelling); Brown, 366 U.S. at 
607 (state's interest in providing a uniform day of rest compelling). 
12. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
13. 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd without op., 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 
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tant free exercise case in years. 
Contemporary scholars have devoted ample attention to the 
Court's free exercise jurisprudence.I4 The scope of this comment 
is thus appropriately limited to consideration of the fundamen-
tal free exercise questions presented by Hialeah. 
Although some review is obviously necessary, this comment 
is not intended as a comprehensive discussion of recent free ex-
ercise cases. 111 Principally, issues which remain unresolved in the 
wake of the Court's Smith decision will be addressed, including 
the following. Observing that "neQ.trality" is the cornerstone of 
the Smith decision, what evidence may properly be considered 
when making the neutrality assessment? Will facial-neutrality 
be dispositive?I8 Additionally, assuming that Smith is not con-
trolling, are the challenged regulations appropriately subject to 
heightened review? Or will strict scrutiny be limited, as the 
Smith majority suggested,I7 to the specific context of unemploy-
ment compensation regulations?I8 As a related question, the 
Court should also speak to the issue of whether the government 
will be required to furnish "specific evidence" in support of any 
1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992). 
14. See, e.g., McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5 (analyzing free exer-
cise doctrine from an historical perspective); Michael W. McConnel, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) (analyzing the Supreme 
Court's recent Smith decision) [hereinafter McConnel, "Free Exercise Revisionism"); 
PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962) (arguing that when read together the 
religion clauses prohibit religion-specific policy); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of 
the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme 
Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978) (also arguing against religion-specific policy) [hereinafter 
Kurland, "The Irrelevance of the Constitution"); WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976) (analyzing free exercise doctrine 
on originalist grounds); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF 
THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978) (also analyzing free exercise doctrine on 
originalist grounds). 
15. For a more comprehensive review of the Court's free exercise decisions, see LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14 (2nd ed. 1988). For further useful 
discussion regarding recent free exercise decisions, see Roberto A. Torricella, Jr., Babalu 
Aye Is Not Pleased: Majoritarianism and the Erosion of Free Exercise, 45 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1061 (1991). 
16. See infra notes 263-88 and accompanying text arguing that extrinsic evidence 
should properly be considered. 
17. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 
U.S. 913 (1990). 
18. See infra notes 289-309 and accompanying text arguing that the challenged reg-
ulations should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
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interest asserted as compelling.19 Resolution of this question 
would be useful in terms of reconciling the Court's opinions in 
the unemployment compensation cases (sensitive to the lack of 
specific evidence)20 with its decisions elsewhere.21 
This comment will be organized in the following manner. 
Section II examines the debate between two leading interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment: "accommodation" and "formal 
neutrality." This debate provides a useful point of departure be-
cause it highlights the significance of controversy surrounding 
contemporary free exercise doctrine. Section III next reviews the 
district court's Hialeah opinion. Particular emphasis is placed 
on the nature and origins of the Santeria faith. Turning to the 
Supreme Court's major free exercise cases, Section IV then ex-
plores the Court's opinions prior to, and including, Smith. Fi-
nally, focusing specifically on the facts of Hialeah, Section Vat-
tempts to resolve the questions set forth above. 
Favoring a broad construction of the Free Exercise Clause, 
this comment ultimately argues that the municipal ordinances 
challenged in Hialeah must be subject to strict scrutiny and the 
Supreme Court's holding in Smith to a narrow interpretation if 
the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment are to re-
tain any significant meaning. "[NJo liberty," Justice Stewart 
once declared, "is more essential to the continued viability of 
the free society which our Constitution guarantees than is the 
religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause explicit in 
the First Amendment and imbedded in the Fourteenth."22 
19. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text arguing that the Court should 
reinstate the specific evidence requirement. 
20. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1978) (possibility of fraudulent 
claims insufficient to justify free exercise infringement where there was "no proof 
whatever to warrant such fears"); Frazee v. Unemployment Security Dept., 489 U.S. 829, 
835 (1989) (also emphasizing absence of evidence supporting State's position); Thomas v. 
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (same). 
21. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 911-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing con-
spicuous absence of evidence supporting State's position); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599, 615 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that State's concerns were "more fan-
ciful than real"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,224 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing) (to the same effect). 
22. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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II. DEBATING FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE: 
ACCOMMODATION AND FORMAL NEUTRALITY 
The First Amendment commands that government shall not 
"prohibit" the free exercise of religion.23 But should the Amend-
ment be interpreted broadly to prohibit severe interference with 
religious exercise as well? An "accommodationist," like Professor 
McConnel, would say yes. 24 Conversely, Professor Kurland, who 
supports the doctrine of "formal neutrality," would say no.211 
While the former argues that the Free Exercise Clause "protects 
religious practices against even the incidental or unintended ef-
fects of government action,"26 the latter posits that "[t]he pri-
mary purpose of the First Amendment is to keep government 
out of religious matters."27 
Because the Court has never entertained a single definitive 
interpretation of the First Amendment, we do not know who is 
correct. We do know, however, that, as an historical matter, the 
Court has embraced both views.28 Indeed, tension between ac-
commodation and formal neutrality has largely shaped the 
Court's free exercise jurisprudence.29 Recognizing this, we turn 
to a brief discussion of these positions here. 
The debate between accommodation and formal neutrality 
centers mainly on the question of whether the First Amendment 
sanctions religion-specific policy.30 The debate, in other words, is 
23. u.S. CONST. amend I. 
24. See generally Michael W. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion: An Update 
and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 687-95 (1992) (presenting the 
affirmative case for accommodation) [hereinafter McConnel, "Accommodation of Reli-
gion"); McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1416-21 (arguing that his-
torical evidence supports an interpretation favorable to accommodation). 
25. See generally Kurland, RELIGION AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 112 (arguing 
that religion may not be used as a standard for governmental action or inaction); Kur-
land, The Irrelevance of the Constitution, supra note 14, at 24. 
26. McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1418 (emphasis added). 
27. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution, supra note 14, at 13. 
28. See McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1416-21. 
29. See infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text. 
30. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 689 ("The debate be-
tween accommodation and formal neutrality comes down to a question of means: Is the 
freedom of religion best achieved when the government is conscious of the effects of its 
action on the various religious practices of its people, and seeks to minimize interfer-
ences with those practices? Or is it best advanced through a policy of 'religious blind-
ness' - keeping government aloof from religious practices and issues."). 
6
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marked by sharp disagreement on the issue of whether the gov-
ernment should treat religion like any other activity or institu-
tion.31 In turn, and perhaps more importantly, these positions 
reflect fundamentally different conceptions of the threat govern-
ment poses to religious liberty.32 Formal neutrality, which 
. teaches that religion-specific policy is' inappropriate absent in-
vidious discrimination, assumes that religious exercise will re-
ceive adequate protection in the political arena.33 Accommoda-
tionists, on the other hand, reject the idea that a narrow 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause will adequately serve 
to protect religious exercise.34 Instead, accommodationists argue 
that the government must necessarily be required to justify even 
incidental interference with religious exercise.36 
A comprehensive discussion of this debate is clearly beyond 
the limited scope of this comment.88 But a strong argument can 
be made in favor of accommodation. Professor Kurland insists 
that government must not meddle in religious affairs.87 Yet "in 
the modern regulatory state, most activities and institutions are 
pervasively regulated."88 Consequently, more than "religious 
31. See Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 848 (1992) (highly critical of the Court's recent movement 
towards formal neutrality) [hereinafter Laycock, "Summary and Synthesis"); McConnel, 
Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 689. 
32. McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1418. 
33. Id. at 1419-20. 
34. See, e.g., McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 693. 
35. See McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1418 (emphasis 
added); see also Laycock, Summary and Synthesis, supra note 31, at 689 ("[T)he Free 
Exercise Clause includes the right to be left alone; whether or not other activities and 
institutions are let alone, save only where government has a compelling reason to 
interfere. "). 
36. For further discussion of accommodation, see Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with 
Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substan-
tive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Towards Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); 
Michael W. McConnel, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146 
(1986); Michael W. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Mc-
Connel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1419-20. For further discussion of 
formal neutrality, see Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": 
Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of 
Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988). 
37. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution, supra note 14, at 9 ("religion was 
to be no business of the national government"). 
38. Laycock, Summary and Synthesis, supra note 31, at 848; see also McConnel, 
Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 692 ("Government is too pervasive -
to'uches too much - for a strategy of formal neutrality to work."). 
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blindness" would seem to be required.a9 "Religious exercise," 
Professor Laycock points out, "is not free when it is pervasively 
regulated."'o Thus, while "[i]t is good to protect against persecu-
tion and overt religious discrimination ... under the conditions 
of the welfare-regulatory state, it is necessary to do more - to 
take deliberate action to preserve the autonomy of religious 
life. "41 
For our purpose here, resolving the debate is unnecessary. 
Suffice it to say that there is credence to both positions. How-
ever, because tension between these competing views has largely 
shaped the Court's free exercise jurisprudence, recognizing that 
striking differences separate accommodation and formal neu-
trality is important. As a practical matter, the difference be-
tween accommodation and formal neutrality is the difference be-
tween a Court which is sympathetic to religious claims and one 
which is not. 
III. CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. v. 
CITY OF HIALEAH 
A. THE BASIC DISPUTE 
On April 1, 1987, plaintiffs, the Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. (the "Church"), and Ernesto Pichardo, Presi-
dent of the Church ("Pichardo"),·2 instituted measures to com-
mence operation of a Santeria church on property located within 
the City of Hialeah, Florida.48 These measures included, inter 
alia, filing the requisite zoning and licensing applications" and 
39. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 692. 
40. Laycock, Summary and Synthesis, supra note 31, at 848 
41. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 693. 
42. Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989), aff'd without op., 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 
(1992). Pichardo testified that within his Church, he held the rank of "Italero," which is 
the second highest rank in Santeria. [d. at 1470 and 1470 n.8. The highest rank in 
Santeria is "Babalawo." [d. at 1470 n.8. Pichardo testified further that he did not know 
if anyone within his Church held the rank of Babalawo. [d. 
43. [d. at 1477. Church members also planned to build a school, cultural center and 
museum. [d. at 1476. 
44. Pichardo eventually completed the application for licensing and zoning approval 
on May 29, 1987. [d. at 1477. He did so after first having been informed by a City official 
that the Church was operating in violation of the licensing requirement. [d. at 1477 n.42. 
Although the Church fully intended to perform ritual animal sacrifice on Church prop-
erty, the application failed to disclose this. [d. at 1477 n.43. Prior to trial, however, the 
8
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physically preparing the property.411 The goal was "to bring 
Santeria into the open as an established and accepted 
religion. "46 
Shortly thereafter, the Hialeah City Council enacted several 
ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice.47 The first ordinance, 
Ordinance No. 87-40 (adopting the State's anti-cruelty law),48 
was enacted on June 9, 1987.49 The three remaining ordinances 
followed during September.llo In turn, the Church filed suit in 
federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "to enjoin, 
declare unconstitutional, and recover damages for the alleged 
deprivation of [its] constitutional rights, under the First, Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments."lIl The Church alleged further 
constitutional violations based on the City's "process of discour-
agement, harassment, threats, punishment, detention, and 
threats of prosecution. "112 According to the district court, the 
Church was specifically "seeking the right of the Church to per-
form animal sacrifices on Church premises, and for the right of 
Church did apply for an occupational license authorizing them to operate their property 
as a slaughterhouse. Id. at 1477. . 
45. The property, having formerly served as a used car lot, was apparently in need 
of significant work. "There was oil on the ground and car parts lying around; windows 
were broken; the grass was high; and the buildings needed repair work before they could 
be occupied." Id. at 1477 n.38. 
Church premises later failed three inspections: fire, electrical and plumbing. Id . . at 
1478. These inspections furnished the substance of the Church's claim of discriminatory 
treatment, which the court rejected. Id. The court found that the failures were not the 
result of discrimination on the part of the inspectors or any City official. Id. The Church 
also complained of two instances of alleged increased law enforcement scrutiny. The 
court rejected this complaint as well. Id. at 1478-79. The first instance involved the es-
tablishment of a police perimeter when the Church held its first outdoor mass. The sec-
ond instance involved an uneventful episode where police stopped Pichardo. The court 
found that in both instances, the police were simply carrying out their duties. Id. at 
1479. 
46. Id. at 1476. During trial, Dr. Lisandro Perez, a sociologist, questioned whether or 
not permitting the Church to practice its rituals openly would in fact facilitate this ob-
jective. He testified that "[t]here may be a lot of Santeros who may not wish to place 
their beliefs on a public sort of marketplace." Id. at 1470 n.7. 
47. Id. at 1476. 
48. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text setting forth the text of Ordi-
nance No. 87-40. 
49. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1476. See also infra notes 142-64 and accompanying 
text detailing the challenged ordinances. 
50. Hialeah, 723F. Supp. at 1476. 
51. Id. at 1469. 
52.Id. 
9
Fliegel: A Reader's Companion
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
608 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:599 
Church members to perform sacrifices in their own homes."118 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The district court conducted a bench trial lasting nine 
days. II" Jurisdiction was found pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(providing that federal courts have original jurisdiction over all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (providing for jurisdiction 
of actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).1111 The proceed-
ings were clearly intended to be comprehensive,1I6 and warrant 
review here. 
1. Factual Findings 
a. Santeria 
Santeria is an ancient religion which originated almost 4000 
years ago with the Bantu people of West Africa.1I7 In a fashion 
similar to most religions, Santeria provides for days of worship, 
a sabbath, and for religious holidays.1I6 "There are ceremonies 
for life cycle events such as child birth, marriage and death 
rites."119 There is no centralized authority.60 Rather, Santeria 
continues to be based on interpretation of an oral tradition.61 
Beliefs and practices, however, have apparently remained fairly 
constant throughout the centuries.62 . 
Modernly, the Yoruba people of West Africa have adopted 
53. [d. 
54. [d. The trial ran from July 31 to August 15, 1989. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. See id. at 1482. 
57. [d. Santeria is one of the common names for the Lukumi religion. [d. Lukumi is 
also known as Yoba or Yoruba. [d. For a comprehensive discussion of Santeria, see 
MIGENE GONZALES-WIPPLES. SANTERIA: THE RELIGION (1989). 
58. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1470. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. The district court additionally observed that no written code or tradition 
appears to exist. [d. Prior to trial, Pichardo did prepare a "Code of Beliefs" and "Code 
of Ethics." [d. at 1470 n.9. Yet while Pichardo testified that these documents were in-
tended to correctly set forth the oral tradition, the district court voiced some concern 
that the documents were prepared in anticipation of the litigation. [d. at 1470 and 1470 
n.9. 
61. [d. at 1470. 
62. [d. 
10
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the religious traditions of the Bantu people, and Santeria is 
practiced openly today in Southern Nigeria.6s Outside of Africa, 
however, Santeria has historically been regarded. as an "under-
ground" religion.64 In fact, "for 400 years, Santeria was an un-
derground religion practiced mostly by slaves and the descend-
ants of slaves. "6G 
Santeria is still not socially accepted in countries other than 
Africa.66 Instead, "Santeria has remained an underground reli-
gion because most practitioners fear that they will be discrimi-
nated against."67 In contrast to Nigeria, the practice of Santeria 
outside of Africa has thus "taken on a private, personal tone."68 
This appears to be true in the United States as well, where there 
are approximately 50,000 to 60,000 adherents in South Florida 
alone.69 
b. The Sacrificial Ceremony 
Animal sacrifice is an integral part of Santeria rituals and 
ceremonies.70 These sacrifices include, but are not limited to, 
63. Id. at 1469. 
64. Id. at 1470. Santeria was originally brought to Cuba when, during the 16th, 17th 
and 18th centuries, large numbers of Y oba practitioners were enslaved by the Spanish 
government. Id. at 1469. 
65. Id. at 1470. The Spanish government often justified slavery as the "business of 
saving souls," and captured slaves, who were frequently baptized, were expected to be-
come Christians. Id. at 1469 and 1469 n.3. Yet while the practice of Santeria was gener-
ally prohibited, Santeria survived. This was possible because the slaves began to express 
their faith through the use of Catholic saints and symbols. "For example, because Saint 
Peter was associated with iron, the keys to heaven, Yoba practitioners saw Saint Peter as 
Shango, the god of lightening and thunder." Id. at 1469-70 and 1470 n.4. 
66. Id. at 1470. 
67. Id. The district court also noted that Santeria has lost some contact with its own 
past in Cuba. Id. The court explained that this has resulted from the fact that "[tlhere is 
little or no intermingling of the groups, and few practitioners know others outside their 
own group that practice Santeria." Id. 
68.Id. 
69. Id. Santeria arrived in the United States with the Cuban exiles who fled from 
the Castro regime in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Id. 
70. Id. at 1471. The district court provided the following details relating to the sac-
rificial ceremony. 
In the Yoba religion, divination is based on the ita divina-
tion cycle. Ita is made up of 256 odus or principles. Each odu 
is further subdivided in groups of 16. Divination through ita is 
usually performed by the casting of shells or stones. The pat-
tern is then read and interpreted as communication from the 
various deities. 
11
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goats, sheep, chicken, doves and other small fowl. 71 
Priests perform the sacrificial ceremony. These priests are 
trained through oral apprenticeship.72 Apprentice priests are not 
trained to determine whether or not sacrificial animals are dis-
ease-free.7s Ani~als are expected to be clean and healthy." 
Priests who perform the actual sacrifice do not otherwise partici-
pate in obtaining, maintaining, preparing, butchering, cooking or 
disposing. of the sacrificial animals.711 Ideally, only trained priests 
conduct the ceremony.78 
Sacrificial animals are dispatched by use of a knife." The 
number of sacrifices is dictated by the number of deities in-
volved in the particular ceremony.78 For example, in an initia-
tion ceremony, anywhere from 24 to 56 animals are sacrificed to 
between 6 and 13 deities.79 Pichardo testified that he had no 
idea of the average number of sacrifices performed each week 
within Hialeah.80 He did estimate, however, that as many as 600 
Through divination, ita mandates the type of animal to be 
sacrificed and the use to which the sacrifice should be put. It 
is the individual priests, however, who interpret, or misinter-
pret, the basic principles of ita. 
[d. at 1471 n.14. Animal sacrifice is also apparently practiced by a number of other Afro-
Caribbean religions, like Voo-doo, Macumba, and Palo Mayombe. [d. at 1470. 
71. [d. at 1471. Sacrificial animals are usually obtained from a "botanica," a store 
specializing in the sale of religious articles. [d. at 1474 and 1474 n.B. 
72. [d. at 1471. Pichardo testified that apprentice priests begin learning through ob" 
servation. [d. Eventually, the apprentice graduates to practical training. "The teacher 
and the student both hold onto the knife and the teacher guides the student through the 
killing stroke a number of times." [d. at 1472 n.15. When the teacher is satisfied that the 
apprentice can adequately perform the ceremony, the student is allowed to kill 'the 
animal without assistance. [d. at 1472. 
73. [d. at 1471. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. Although priests who perform the actual sacrifice do not participate in the 
other stages of preparation, other priests do in fact participate. "For example, there are 
those who clean-up after the sacrifice; a person who actually handles the animal - in-
spects the animal to see that it is healthy and clean and then brings that animal to the 
place where it is to be sacrificed; ... a person who removes the carcass; a butcher or 
butchers; a person who takes the butchered animal to be cooked; a cook or cooks." [d. at 
1471 n.12. 
76. [d. at 1471. 
77. [d. at 1472. Usually the knife is approximately 4 inches long. [d. at 1472 n.17. 
7B. [d. at 1473 n.21. 
79. [d. at 1474. 
BO. [d. at 1471 n.13. 
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initiation ceremonies are performed annually in Dade County.8! 
Based on this testimony, the court concluded that "between 
12,000 and 18,000 animals are sacrificed in initiation rites alone" 
each year. 82 
The sacrificial procedure is as follows. The animal is first 
placed on a table with its head facing away from the priest.8s 
The priest then punctures the right-hand side of the animal's 
neck, inserting the knife into the vein area just behind the 
throat, but not the actual throat itself.84 The objective of the 
procedure is to sever both of the animal's main arteries.811 Blood 
from the animal is drained into clay pots placed underneath the . 
animal's head.8s When the draining is completed, the animal is 
decapitated and removed from the area.87 Though perhaps un-
common, the blood may be placed on the adherents, consumed, 
or left in the pots for long periods of time.88 Until the carcass is 
removed, the blood is placed before the deities.89 The blood is 
later disposed of.90 Again, the priest who performs the actual 
sacrifice is not involved in this procedure. 
There appear to be no rules governing disposal of animal 
carcasses.9! Animal burial or incineration are similarly not pro-
hibited.92 Prior to trial, discarded carcasses had been discovered 
in public places.9s For example, carcasses had been discovered 
near rivers and canals, by stop-signs, and on the lawns or door-
steps of homes.94 The court emphasized that improperly dis-
carded carcasses present a health hazard. The court explained 
that "[a]nimal remains are ... a health hazard because the re-
mains attract flies, rats and other animals. Both vectors and res-
81. [d. at 1473 n.22. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. at 1472. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 1473. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. at 1473 n.21. At least one witness testified that he had been offered blood to 
drink as a child, but refused. [d. 
89. [d. at 1473. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. at 1471. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 1474. 
94. [d. at 1474 n.29. 
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ervoirs are created around such animal remains because the rats, 
flies and other animals that are attracted may themselves carry 
and exchange diseases and thus the risk of the spread of disease 
to humans is increased. "911 
Significantly, though, at the time of trial no instances of in-
fectious disease originating from animal remains had been 
documented.96 
Pichardo testified that most, but not all, animals are con-
sumed after they are sacrificed.97 He testified further, however, 
that he was never involved in the disposal of animal carcasses 
and that he had no knowledge of what is actually done with the 
animal remains, whether or not any part of the animal is con-
sumed.9s He did speculate that the remains of sacrificed animals 
were probably placed in the garbage of private homes.99 
c. Evidence of Inhumane Slaughter and Danger to the 
Psychological Welfare of Children 
At trial, the City offered expert testimony to establish that 
the sacrificial killing was not humane. Specifically, the City's ex-
pert, Dr. Fox, vice-president of the Humane Society, testified 
that the method of killing was not humane, because there was 
no guarantee that both carotid arteries could be severed simulta-
neously.loo Dr. Fox testified further that animals would experi-
ence pain, fear and stress both before and during the actual sac-
rifice. lOl Based on this testimony, the court concluded that the 
95. [d:at 1474-75. 
96. [d. at 1474. 
97. [d. at 1471. Animals used in healing rites (usually a single animal) are appar-
ently almost never consumed. [d. at 1471 n.ll. The illness is apparently considered to 
have passed to the animal, and "[tJhe animal is not eaten, but is either placed on the 
altar of the deity for several hours, or is disposed of entirely." [d. at 1474. In death rites 
(usually requiring the sacrifice of one four legged animal and two fowl) the animals are 
similarly not consumed. [d. at 1474 n.26. 
98. [d. at 1471. In fact, "[nJo witness could recall ever seeing how a carcass was 
disposed of." [d. at 1474 n.27. 
99. [d. at 1471 n.13. 
100. [d. at 1472. The City's expert also testified that because chickens have four 
such arteries, it was even less likely that all of the animal's arteries could be severed at 
once. [d. 
101. [d. at 1473. Dr. Fox testified further that. slaughtering chickens in this manner 
would be dangerous to humans. He explained that stress and fear lead to the increased 
14
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ceremony was not a "reliable or painless" method for sacrificing 
animals. l02 
The City also introduced expert testimony that children, 
when accompanied by an adult, are permitted to attend sacrifi-
cial ceremonies, and that observing sacrificial ceremonies would 
be detrimental to the mental health of such children. loa The 
City's expert, Dr. Raul Huesmann, a research psychologist, testi-
fied that exposing a child to animal sacrifice "would be likely to 
increase the probability that the child [will] behave aggressively 
and violently, not just against animals but against humans."l04 
Dr. Huesmann explained that "the observation would be likely 
to produce psychologica1 processes that promote greater toler-
ance of aggressive violent behavior," specifically desensitization, 
tolerance and imitation.lo~ He explained further that because 
priests are perceived as persons of high status, the effect might 
well be aggravated. lOS Imitation, he suggested, would be more 
likely.l07 Dr. Huesmann apparently based his testimony on re-
search relating to the development of aggressive and violent be-
havior in children and adults. lOS No reference is 'made in the 
opinion to specific examinations or interviews conducted by Dr. 
Huesmann personally or by other psychologists. 
B. THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE 
1. Standing and Ripeness 
As a preliminary matter, the district court expressed con-
cern for whether the Church had standing to bring suit. Specifi-
cally, the court expressed concern for whether the dispute 
presented an "actual controversy," as required by the Declara-
growth of bacteria in the chicken's immune system, especially salmonella, and that this 
danger could not be detected by visual inspection. [d. 
102. [d. at 1472. 
103. [d. at 1474 n.24. 
104. [d. at 1475. The court rejected expert testimony disputing this correlation. [d. 
at 1476. This testimony was furnished by Dr. Angel Velez-Diaz, a clinical psychologist. 
Dr. Velez-Diaz agreed that children exposed to animal sacrifice would be desensitized 
towards violence, but did not believe that negative effects would occur because children 
witnessing animal sacrifice are usually prepared for the event. [d. at 1476. 
105. [d. at 1475. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. 
108. See id. at 1475-76. 
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tory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.109 The court reasoned 
that even assuming the challenged ordinances were invalid, state 
law (which was not challenged) still prohibited inhumane 
slaughter.110 
The court was further concerned with the ripeness issue. 
The court emphasized that no attempts to enforce the ordi-
nances were made by the City prior to trial.lll 
Despite these concerns, the court proceeded to the merits of 
the case. Notably, though, the court expressly limited the range 
of issues to be considered. In particular, the court refused to ad-
dress the "abstract question of whether all laws restricting 
animal sacrifice for religious purposes are unconstitutional, or 
whether [church members] could practice animal sacrifice if they 
were in an area zoned for a slaughterhouse. 11m 
2. State Statutory Preemption 
The Church raised several preemption arguments. Mainly, 
the Church argued that the challenged ordinances were invalid 
because state law exempted ritual animal slaughter.11s According 
to the Church, the ritual slaughter exemption was intended to 
"preempt municipalities from legislating any regulations whatso-
ever on ritual slaughter .... "114 The court rejected this argument 
reasoning that because the Hialeah ordinances only banned 
slaughter performed outside of the regulatory requirements of 
109. Id. at 1479. 
110. Id. See also infra note 146 and accompanying text setting forth the text of the 
Florida prohibition. 
111. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1479. The court did not, however, discuss whether or 
not Church members had actually attempted to sacrifice any animals on the premises. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1480. At that time, Florida animal cruelty law provided that "in order to 
protect freedom of religion, ritual slaughter and the handling or other preparation of 
livestock for ritual slaughter are exempted from the" prohibition against inhumane 
slaughter. FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 828, § 828.22(3) (West 1987). For the purpose of Section 
828.22(3), "ritual slaughter" was defined as slaughter by a "humane method," in turn 
defined as "[al method in accordance with ritual requirements of any religious faith 
whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the 
simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instru-
ment." FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 828, § 828.23(7)(b) (West 1987). 
114. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1480. 
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both local and state laws, no conflict existed.11II 
The Church also argued that the ordinances were invalid 
because they provided for criminal sanctions while state law 
only provided for civil penalties.ue The court similarly rejected 
this argument. The court reasoned that the ordinances, as pri-
marily zoning regulations, did not conflict with the state law, ad-
dressed to preventing animal cruelty.ll7 
3. First Amendment Challenge 
Having determined that animal sacrifice was an integral 
part of the Santeria faith,· the court concluded that the chal-
lenged regulations "burdened" the Church's religious prac-
tices.ll8 Notwithstanding this finding, the court, though sensitive 
to the nature of the challenge,119 rejected the Church's free exer-
cise claim. 
The court recognized that ultimately the issue of whether 
the interests asserted by the City were sufficiently compelling to 
justify the ban on animal sacrifice would largely be disposi-
tive. l2O According to the court, however, resolution of two 
threshold questions was first necessary. The first question con-
cerned whether the ordinances regulated religious conduct 
rather than religious belief.121 The court concluded that this re-
quirement was clearly satisfied because the ordinances regulated 
the performance of animal sacrifice.122 The second question was 
whether the ordinances served a secular purpose.128 The court 
similarly concluded that the ordinances satisfied this require-
115. [d. at 1481. 
116. [d. 
117. [d. The court explained that while one of the secular purposes of the chal-
lenged ordinances was to prevent cruelty to animals, the ordinances were "first and fore-
most zoning ordinances" and were not "in and of themselves, 'ordinances related to 
animal control or cruelty.' " [d. . 
118. [d. at 1485. See also infra notes 183-94 and accompanying text discussing the 
cognizable burden requirement. 
119. While the court did not discuss the history of the first amendment at length, 
the opinion suggests that the court was sensitive to the nature of the Church's claim. See 
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1482-83. 
120. See id. at 1483 and 1484. 
121. [d. at 1483. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. 
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ment. While observing that "the Church's announcement trig-
gered the legislative action," the court emphasized that the ordi-
nances were "not aimed solely at [the Church], but were an 
attempt to address the issue of animal sacrifice as a whole."12. 
The court stressed further that absent the requisite neutrality, 
the ordinances were still valid. "Strict religious neutrality," the 
court remarked, "is not required by the First Amendment."1211 
Having determined that both threshold requirements were 
satisfied, the court next turned to the task of balancing the gov-
ernmental and religious interests. The court identified three gov-
ernmental interests: safeguarding the health, welfare and safety 
of the community; safeguarding the psychological welfare of 
children; and preventing cruelty to animals. 126 The court con-
cluded that each interest was sufficiently compelling to justify 
the ban.127 
With regard to the City's interest in safeguarding the com-
munity's health, welfare and safety, the court held that the City 
had sustained its burden to prove that anima~ sacrifice posed a 
substantial health risk.128 Emphasizing evidence that animal re-
mains pose a health hazard, the court concluded that there was 
a risk of physical harm to both church members and the public 
from disease and infestation. 129 
The court held further that the ban on animal sacrifice was 
justified by the City's interest in protecting the welfare of chil-
dren.13o Remarking that the City had a "particularly strong" in-
124. [d. While recognizing that the ordinances made frequent use of terms having 
largely religious significance, terms such as "sacrifice," "ritual" and "ceremony," the 
court concluded that the ordinances did not on their face violate the secular purpose 
test. The court explained that the ordinances were not intended to "single out persons 
engaged in ritual sacrifice, but to put those persons on notice that the state exemption 
for ritual slaughter only applied to commercial ritual slaughter, done in slaughter-
houses." [d. at 1484. The court explained further that the ordinances were intended to 
reach not only "demonstrably bona fide religious conduct," but also "the killing of ani-
mals by groups that would probably not enjoy First Amendment protection, such as sa-
tanic cults." [d. Significantly, the court's inquiry here was limited to the statutory 
language. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 1485. 
127. [d. at 1486. 
128. [d. at 1485. 
129. [d. 
130. Id. at 1486. 
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terest here,13l the court stressed the significance of evidence that 
children witnessing animal sacrifice might become more aggres-
sive and violent, and thus that the child's behavior might be-
come "detrimental to the community."132 
Finally, the court held that the City's interest in preventing 
cruelty to animals was sufficiently compelling.133 The court em-
phasized evidence that the method of killing sacrificial animals 
was inhumane, and that animals experience fear, pain and stress 
both before and during the sacrificiai ceremony.134 
The court further rejected the Church's argument for a reli-
gious exemption. l3Ii Explaining that" [i]t is often difficult, if not 
impossible, to tell who is responsible for a particular sacrifice," 
the court held that an exemption would "defeat the City's valid 
and compelling interests."136 The court was concerned that an 
"exception would, in effect, swallow the rule."137 
4. Section 1983 Claim 
The court also rejected the Church's Section 1983 claim.138 
To maintain a successful claim, the court observed, the Church 
was required to prove more than a single incident of discrimina-
tion or harassment.139 The court rejected the Church's claim rea-
soning that the Church failed to meet this burden. 140 
Having determined that each of the claims brought by the 
Church failed, the court entered judgment in favor of the 
City.l4l 
131. [d. at 1485. 
132. [d. at 1475. 
133. [d. at 1486. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 1486-87. 
136. [d. at 1487. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 1488. 
139. See id. at 1487. 
140. [d. at 1488. 
141. [d. 
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C. TEXT OF THE ORDINANCES 
This subsection sets forth the text of the challenged ordi-
nances. The district court rejected the Church's argument that 
these ordinances were discriminatory. The court concluded 
rather that the ordinances were intended to address the issue of 
animal sacrifice as a whole.142 Two additional observations by 
the court are relevant here as well. First, that the Church's an-
nouncement triggered the legislative action. Second, that there 
was some evidence supporting the Church's argument, specifi-
cally that "[t]here was testimony to the effect that the council 
meetings that took place concerning the Church were done in a 
mob atmosphere and that the council members intended to dis-
criminate against the Church and to stop the Church. "143 
1. Ordinance No. 87-40 
The City enacted Ordinance No. 87-40 on June 9, 1987.144 
The ordinance simply adopts Florida's statutory prohibition 
against animal cruelty.1411 The Florida statute provides that: 
[w]hoever unnecessarily overloads, overdrives, 
tortures, torments, deprives of necessary suste-
nance or shelter, or unnecessarily or cruelly beats, 
mutilates, or kills any animal, or causes the same 
to be done, or carries in or upon any vehicle, or 
otherwise, any animal in a cruel or inhumane 
manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the 
first degree. . . .146 
Ordinance No. 87-40 did not adopt the portion of the Florida 
statute relating to penalties.147 The penalty for violating the or-
dinance was rather fixed at "a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by 
a jail sentence, not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the dis-
cretion of the court. "148 
142. Id. at 1483. 
143. Id. at 1478. 
144. Id. at 1476. 
145. HIALEAH ORD. 87-40(1) (1987). 
146. FLA. STAT. Ch. 828, § 828.12 (West 1987). 
147. See HIALEAH ORD. 87-40(1) (1987). 
148 .. HIALEAH ORD. 87-40(3) (1987). 
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2. Ordinance No. 87-52 
Ordinance No. 87-52 was adopted on September 8, 1987.149 
Subject to zoning and licensing exemptions,1I10 the ordinance 
prohibits the possession, sacrifice, or slaughter of animals for 
food purposes. lII1 Subsection 2 provides further that the prohibi-
tion applies "to any group or individual that kills, slaughters or 
sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or 
not the flesh of the animal is to be consumed."1112 Sacrifice is 
defined as the act of "unnecessarily killing, tormenting, tortur-
ing, or mutilating an animal in a public or private ritual or cere-
mony not for the primary purpose of food consumption."uI3 
Slaughter is defined as the "killing of animals for food."uI4 Com-
parable sanctions are available.11I1I 
3. Ordinance No. 87-71 
Ordinance No. 98-71 was enacted on September 22, 1987.lII6 
The ordinance prohibits animal sacrifice within the City's corpo-
rate limits.lII7 Ordinance No. 87-71 defines the terms "sacrifice" 
and "animal" in the same manner as Ordinance No. 87_52.1118 
The preamble explains that animal sacrifice "is contrary to the 
public health, safety, welfare and'morals of the community."11I9 
Comparable sanctions are again available.160 
149, Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1476. 
150. Ordinance No. 87-52 provides that "nothing in this ordinance is to be inter-
preted as prohibiting any licensed establishment from slaughtering for food purposes any 
animals which are specifically raised for food purposes where such activity is properly 
zoned and/or permitted under state and local law and under rules promulgated by the 
Florida Department of Agriculture." HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-9(3) (1987). 
151. HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-9(1) (1987). An animal is defined as "any living dumb 
creature." HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-8(1) (1987). 
152. HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-9(2) (1987). 
153. HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-8(2) (1987). 
154. HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-8(3) (1987). 
155. See HIALEAH ORD. 87-52, § 6-9(3) (1987). 
156. Hialeah, _723 F. Supp. at 1476. 
157. HIALEAH ORD. 87-71 (1987). 
158. See HIALEAH ORD. 87-71 §§ (1) and (2) (1987). 
159. HIALEAH ORD. 87-71 (1987). 
160. See HIALEAH ORD. 87-71(7) (1987). 
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4. Ordinance No. 87-72 
Ordinance No. 87-72 was also adopted on September 22, 
1987.lSl The ordinance prohibits animal slaughter on premises 
within Hialeah, "except those properly zoned as a slaughter 
house, and meeting all the health, safety and sanitation codes 
prescribed by the City for operation of a slaughter house."ls2 
The slaughter of livestock in accordance with state law is ex-
empted. lss Available sanctions also include a fine or jail sen-
tence, together or separately.ls4 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has traditionally drawn an important 
distinction between religious beliefs and religious conduct. Chief 
Justice Waite first articulated the justification for this distinc-
tion in Reynolds v. United States.lSr. There, rejecting the notion 
that religious conduct would never be subject to regulation, he 
reasoned that "[t]o permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious beliefs superior to the laws of the land, and 
in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."lss 
He reasoned further that "[g]overnment could exist only in 
name under such circumstances."lS? 
While consistently adopting Chief Justice Waite's reasoning 
in Reynolds/ss subsequent decisions have focused mainly on in-
161. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1476. 
162. HIALEAH ORO. 87-72(3) (1987). "Slaughter" is again defined as "the killing of 
animals for food." HIALEAH ORO. 87-72(1) (1987). 
163. HIALEAH ORO. 87-72(6) (1987), 
164. See HIALEAH ORO. 87-72(8) (1987). 
165. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
166. Id. at 166-67. 
167. Id. 
168. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 
452 (1988) ("[Gjovernment simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every 
citizen's religious needs and desires."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) 
("To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety 
of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good."); Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599,604 (1961) ("[Ljegislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but 
it may reach people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social 
duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's reli-
gion."); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 652 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) ("The constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, 
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terpreting the practical significance of the belief-conduct dis-
tinction. Reconciling these decisions can be difficult. Most 
claims have triggered strict scrutiny.le9 Thus, one of the Court's 
more recent opinions counseled that "[t]he free exercise inquiry 
asks whether [the] government has placed a substantial burden 
on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if 
so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the bur-
den."17o But modernly, the Court has favored a far less discrimi-
nating standard of review.17l Moreover, the Court has expressly 
determined that where generally applicable neutral regulations 
it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence 
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law be-
cause of religious dogma."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (Religious 
"[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."); Davis v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890) ("However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be 
subordinate to the criminal laws of the country .... "); see also Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990); Bowen v. Roy, 476 
U.S. 693, 708 n.15 (1986); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
The Court has suggested that Thomas Jefferson similarly contemplated this concern 
when he said: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other 
than his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of 
government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contem-
plate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should make "no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation be-
tween church and state. Adhering to this expression of the su-
preme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I 
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those senti-
ments which tend to restore to man' all his natural rights, con-
vinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social 
duties. 
Brown, 366 U.S. at 604 (quoting 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113). 
169. Strict scrutiny was applied in each of the four unemployment compensation 
regulation cases. See infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text. Prior to Smith, however, 
strict scrutiny was not expressly limited to this context. See, e,g., Hernandez v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 933 (1989); 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983); Lee, 455 U.S. at 257; Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). Professor McConnel argues that in practice, even 
while purporting to apply the compelling interest test, the Court actually applied a more 
relaxed standard of review. McConnel, Free Ex(!rcise Revisionism, supra note 14, at 
1109. He suggests that "[t]he Court generally found either that the free exercise right 
was not burdened or that the government interest was compelling." Id. 
170. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699. 
171. See, e,g., O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (deferential review of 
prison regulations); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (deferential review 
of military regulations); Roy, 476 U.S. at 707-08 (plurality opinion) (deferential review of 
challenge to federal food stamp program regulations). 
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or government conduct relating to its own internal affairs are 
concerned, even minimal scrutiny is unnecessary.I7! 
At first blush, these developments suggest that the Court's 
free exercise jurisprudence has largely been characterized by an 
ad hoc approach to constitutional adjudication. To some extent, 
this assessment may be accurate.173 Arguably, though, some 
sense can be made of the Court's decisions. This can be accom-
plished by examining the cases with reference to the forces 
which have shaped the Court's free exercise jurisprudence: ten-
sion between the need to safeguard the free exercise of religion 
and the need to preserve government autonomy, and tension be-
tween formal neutrality and accommodation. 
To begin with, the Court has never entertained a single de-
finitive interpretation of the First Amendment. When Reynolds 
was decided in 1878, the Court embraced formal neutrality, in-
terpreting the First Amendment to prohibit only overt religious 
discrimination.174 Justice Brennan later turned to an interpreta-
tion favorable to accommodation in Sherbert,171!' but by no 
means did Sherbert resolve the issue. To the contrary, Smith 
has signaled the Court's return to formal neutrality.I76 
The rise of formal neutrality has profound implications. As 
Professor McConnel has explained, "[ t] he difference between 
the two views is the difference between a Free Exercise Clause 
that is a major restraining device on government action that af-
fects religious practices and a Free Exercise Clause that will 
rarely have practical application."177 What is important to recog-
nize here, however, is that tension between these competing 
views has played a vital role in the development of the Court's 
free exercise jurisprudence. Recognizing this is important, be-
cause given the fundamental differences between accommoda-
tion and formal neutrality, the Court's decisions begin to make 
172. With regard to the former, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. See also infra notes 240-
51. With regard to the latter, see Lyng, 485 U.s. at 448. See also infra notes 184-95. 
173. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 1239-40. 
174. McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1411-12. 
175. [d. at 1412. 
176. See McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 696; Laycock, 
Summary and Synthesis, supra note 31, at 848. See also infra notes 235-51 and accom-
panying text discussing the Court's Smith opinion. 
177. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 689. 
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some sense. 
Appreciating the depth of the Court's concern for preserv-
ing government autonomy is also useful in attempting to explain 
the Court's decisions. Free exercise claims are addressed to the 
constitutionality of legislation. Such claims necessarily require 
the Court to balance religious freedom on the one hand against 
the need to protect government autonomy on the other. The 
Court has been willing to intervene on behalf of the former. For 
example, plaintiffs have prevailed in each of the four principal 
cases involving unemployment compensation regulations. 178 Be-
ginning with Reynolds, however, the Court has consistently re-
jected claims posing, at least from the Government's perspective, 
a potential threat to the latter.179 Indeed, the Court has become 
increasingly sensitive to this concern. Accordingly, by examining 
the cases with reference to the relative strength of these com-
peting interests, the Court's decisions similarly appear to be less 
incongruous. The likelihood that the Court will intervene on be-
half of the plaintiff (by applying strict scrutiny) plainly dimin-
ishes in direct proportion to the strength of the government's 
interest. 180 
Having identified the forces which continue to shape the 
Court's free exercise jurisprudence, the remaining portion of this 
section briefly reviews the Court's major free exercise decisions. 
These decisions, it is submitted, offer useful guidance regarding 
both which claims will trigger free exercise review and, assuming 
review is triggered, whether heightened review is appropriate. 
178. See infra notes 204-17 and accompanying text discussing the unemployment 
compensation cases. 
179. With the exception of claims involving unemployment compensation regula-
tions, the Court has, in fact, rejected all free exercise challenges since 1972. McConnel, 
Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 14, at 1109. 
180. Tension between these interests also helps to explain why the Court's free exer-
cise decisions appear to turn on case-specific facts. Clearly the government's interest in 
maintaining order is stronger under some circumstances than others. For example, the 
government has an especially strong interest where military or prison regulations are at 
issue. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987) (involving prison regula-
tions); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,507 (1986) (involving military regulations). 
Case-specific facts have thus been important because the strength of the government's 
interest derives mainly from them. 
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A. FREE EXERCISE REVIEW? 
1. Defining the Contours of Religious Activity 
After Reynolds, it was well settled that the First Amend-
ment would tolerate some restrictions on religious conduct.18l As 
a more fundamental question, however, the Court was left to de-
termine whether religious conduct would ever be protected. Al-
though this question remained unresolved for the better part of 
a century, it was eventually answered in the affirmative when, in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut,t82 Justice Roberts finally declared that 
"[i]n every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as 
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the pro-
tected freedom. "183 
Cantwell, responsive to an important inquiry,' was thus a 
landmark decision. However, the Court's opinion raised an im-
portant question: precisely which claims trigger free exercise re-
view. Most of the significant free exercise cases are addressed to 
this inquiry. In turn, considerable attention has also been de-
voted to the question of when heightened review is required. 
2. The Cognizable Burden Requirement 
Even where the government has imposed a burden on the 
free exercise of religious conduct,184 free exercise claims do not 
181. See Reynolds v. Unitbd States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1978). 
182. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
183. Id. at 304 
184. The imposition of such a burden is a threshold requirement. See, e.g., Her-
nandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 
U.S. 933 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1982); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1978). 
The requirement can be satisfied by several types of regulations. "A State that 
makes criminal an individual's religiously motivated conduct burdens that individual's 
free exercise of religion in the seuerest manner possible, for 'it results in the choice to the 
individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution.' " 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Braunfled v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961» (em-
phasis added). This requirement is additionally satisfied where "the burden is imposed 
directly through laws that prohibit or compel specific religious practices, or indirectly 
through laws that, in effect, make abandonment of one's own religion or conformity to 
the religious beliefs of other the price of an equal place in the civil community." Id. With 
respect to the latter, the Court has recently explained that "[w)here the state conditions 
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always trigger constitutional review. A "substantial" burden is 
required. 1811 This proposition clearly emerges from the Court's 
decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass'n.186 But ,Lyng is also important in an additional respect. 
The Court held that even where imposing a substantial burden 
on religious conduct, laws regulating-the "internal affairs" of the 
government do not trigger free exercise review. 187 In other 
words, Lyng reveals that the Court will now consider the form as 
well as the severity of the burden. Before discussing Lyng it is 
first necessary to briefly consider the Court's opinion two years 
earlier in Bowen v. Roy/88 arguably foreshadowing the Lyng 
Court's holding. 
In Roy, the plaintiffs, Native Americans, challenged a fed-
eral law requiring participants in a food stamp program to fur-
nish Social Security numbers for each household member receiv-
ing benefits. The plaintiffs argued that the regulation was 
unconstitutional because it required them to violate their Native 
American religious beliefs. The plaintiffs argued specifically that 
furnishing the requisite information on behalf of their minor 
daughter would "rob her spirit" and "prevent her from attaining 
receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it 
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting 
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a 
burden upon religion exists." Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 
(1981)); see also Frazee v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 
(1978). For a scholarly analysis of the burden requirement, see Ira C. Lupu, Where 
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise Clause, 102 HARv. L. REV. 
953 (1989). 
For an example of a decision where the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim at this 
stage in the analysis, see Tony & Susan Almo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290 (1985), ",here the Court held that the burden imposed by federal wage and hour 
requirements was insufficient to trigger free exercise review. Id. at 304. The Court rea-
soned that employees having religious objections to receiving wages could simply return 
them to their employer. Id. 
185. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 896; Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). The Court has also discussed the distinction between 
direct and indirect burdens. See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450; Brown, 366 U.S. at 605-07. 
This distinction, however, has been expressly rejected as immaterial. See Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 406 (discriminatory regulations may be invalid "even though the burden may be 
characterized as being only indirect"). 
186. 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) (implying that free exercise scrutiny is only required 
where there is coercive government conduct or where religious activity is penalized). 
187. Id. 
188. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
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greater spiritual power."189 The Court rejected the challenge. 
Chief Justice Burger announced the necessary inquiry. "Ab-
sent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular reli-
gious beliefs or against religion in general," he declared, "the 
Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a chal-
lenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uni-
form in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a 
legitimate public interest."19o "The Free Exercise Clause," Chief 
Justice Burger explained, "simply cannot be understood to re-
quire the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in 
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular 
citizens.1I191 
In Lyng, the Court carried Chief Justice Burger's reasoning 
one step further. There, the plaintiffs, again Native Americans, 
claimed that the U.S. Forest Service's plan to build a road on 
government land traditionally used by several Indian tribes for 
sacred rituals violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court ob-
served that the plan would "have severe adverse effects" on the 
plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.192 But the Court nonetheless 
rejected the challenge. And, most notably, in contrast to Roy, 
the Court did not even purport to apply deferential review.193 
Rather, stressing Chief Justice Burger's language in Roy, the 
Court, in one swift stroke, exempted Government conduct relat-
ing to its own internal affairs from the protective mantle of the 
First Amendment.19' 
Clearly, if the underlying activity is within the scope of the 
Court's decision in Lyng, no further inquiry is necessary: the 
burden, even where substantial, is not constitutionally signifi: 
cant. Under Smith, "generally applicable neutral" laws regulat-
ing religious conduct similarly do not trigger constitutional re-
view.1911 Discussing Smith, requiring. an analogous threshold 
189. [d. at 696. 
190. [d. at 707-08.(emphasis added). 
191. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor 
expressly sanctioned the Court's statement in Roy in Lyng. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448-49. 
192. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447. 
193. See generally id. at 439-58. 
194. [d. at 448. 
195. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 
913 (1990). 
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determination, would thus seem appropriate here. However, be-
cause the full significance of the Court's Smith decision requires 
an appreciation for the development of the Court's pre-Smith 
free exercise jurisprudence, and for the Court's gradual move-
ment away from accommodation, 'our discussion of Smith must 
be momentarily postponed. 
B. THE MOVEMENT AWAY FROM STRICT SCRUTINY: DEFERENTIAL 
REVIEW OF PRISON AND MILITARY REGULATIONS 
Two recent cases, decided within a year of each other, sug-
gest that deferential review is appropriate where the underlying 
dispute involves either prison or military regulations. The first 
of these cases, Goldman v. Weinberger/9s involved a military 
regulation prohibiting the wearing of "headgear indoors except 
by armed security guards."197 The plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew 
and ordained rabbi, was serving in the Air Force reserves. He 
challenged the law after being reprimanded for wearing his yar-
mulke in violation of the regulation. His claim was rejected. 
Speaking for the, Court, Justice Rehnquist announced that 
"[o]ur review of military regulations challenged on First Amend-
ment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review 
of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."198 He 
explained further that "to accomplish its mission the military 
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit 
de corps. "199 
The following year in O'Lone v. Shabazz,20o the Court simi-
larly rejected a challenge brought by Islamic prison inmates 
against prison policies preventing them from attending Jumu'ah, 
a Muslim congregational service held on Friday afternoons. 
Again speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist held that defer-
ential review was appropriate. "[P]rison regulations alleged to 
infringe on constitutional rights," he remarked, "are judged 
under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily 
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional 
196. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
197. [d. at 505. 
198. [d. at 507. 
199. [d. 
200. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
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rights. "201 
In both Weinberger and Shabazz, the Court was clearly sen-
sitive to the government's interest in maintaining order. Thus, 
in Shabazz, Justice Rehnquist explained that deferential review 
of prison policies was necessary because it "ensures the ability of 
corrections officials to anticipate security problems of prison ad-
ministration and avoids unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary 
into problems particularly ill suited to resolution by decree."202 
The decisions thus further support an argument that, to large 
measure, this concern will dictate the outcome of a particular 
controversy. 
C. HEIGHTENED REVIEW? 
Assuming both that free exercise review is triggered and 
that the plaintiff's claim is not within the scope of the Court's 
decisions in Weinberger and Shabazz, heightened review is os-
tensibly appropriate.203 The Court's decisions at this stage of the 
inquiry, however, are not entirely consistent. Strict scrutiny still 
appears to be the rule. But just how "strict" strict scrutiny is 
remains to be seen. 
1. Conditioning Government Benefits 
Since 1963, when Sherbert was decided, it has been well set-
tled that regulations conditioning receipt of government benefits 
upon conduct conflicting with an individual's religious beliefs 
trigger strict scrutiny.204 Speaking for the Court in Hobbie, Jus-
201. [d. at 349. 
202. [d. at 349·50 (citations omitted). 
203. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 933 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commis· 
sion, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257·58 (1982); Thomas 
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626·29 (1978) 
(plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); Gillette v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); see also 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,907 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 723 (1986) (O'Connor, J., con· 
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
204. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("[Olur decisions in the unemployment cases 
stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemp· 
tions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without 
compelling reason."); see also Roy, 476 U.S. at 702. 
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tice Brennan declared that: 
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an impor-
tant benefit upon conduct proscribed by a reli-
gious faith, or where it denies such a benefit be-
cause of conduct mandated by religious beliefs, 
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adher-
ent to modify his behavior and to violate his be-
liefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the 
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement 
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. 20G 
629 
Accordingly, where implicated, the government must demon-
strate either that disqualification of the plaintiff as a potential 
beneficiary "represents no infringement by the State of [the in-
dividual's] constitutional rights of free exercise, or that any inci-
dental burden on the free exercise of religion may be justified by 
a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within 
the State's constitutional power to regulate.' "206 
There are four principal cases in this area. In each case, the 
plaintiff prevailed. We briefly review them here, chronologically. 
In Sherbert v. Verner,207 the plaintiff, a Seventh-day Ad-
ventist, was discharged by her employer because she refused to 
work on Saturdays, the Seventh-day Adventist Sabbath. When 
she was similarly unable to secure alternative employment, also 
because she refused to work on Saturdays, she filed for state un-
employment compensation benefits. After her request for bene-
fits was denied, based expressly on the fact that she was availa-
ble for Saturday work, she brought a free exercise challenge 
against the State. The Court sustained her challenge. Applying 
strict scrutiny, the Court rejected the State's argument that 
preventing fraudulent claims was a sufficiently compelling 
interest.208 
In Thomas v. Review Board,209 the plaintiff, a Jehovah's 
Witness, quit his job at a foundry when, after an initial transfer, 
205. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18). 
206. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
(1962)). 
207. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
208. [d. at 403. 
209. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
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he was assigned to a division responsible for producing weapons. 
He was also denied unemployment compensation benefits based 
on a determination that a "personal philosophical choice rather 
than a religious choice" was involved.210 The Court sustained his 
free exercise challenge reasoning that the disqualifying provision 
of the State's unemployment compensation scheme could not be 
justified either by its asserted interest in protecting the financial 
integrity of its unemployment compensation fund, or in avoiding 
"detailed probing by employers into job applicants' religious 
beliefs. "211 
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,212 the 
plaintiff, also a Seventh-day Adventist, was similarly discharged 
when refusing to work Saturday shifts as assistant manager of a 
retail jewelry store. In contrast to Sherbert, the plaintiff had 
converted to the Seventh-day Adventist Church after commenc-
ing her employment. The Court dismissed this distinction as im-
material. "The First Amendment," proclaimed Justice Brennan, 
"protects the free exercise rights of employees who adopt reli-
gious beliefs or convert from one faith to another after they are 
hired. "213 
Finally, in Frazee v. Illinois,214 the Court again sustained 
the plaintiff's free exercise challenge. Here, the plaintiff, a Chris-
tian, refused to work on Sundays, "the Lord's day."211i He was 
denied unemployment compensation based on his admission 
that he was not a member of a particular religious sect. Also re-
jecting this distinction as immaterial, the Court sustained the 
plaintiff's challenge. The Court expressly rejected "the notion 
that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one 
must be responding to the commands of a particular religious 
organization. "216 
Beyond requiring strict scrutiny, two additional aspects of 
the respective cases are important. The first is that each of the 
210. [d. at 714. 
211. [d. at 719. 
212. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
213. [d. at 144. 
214. 489 U.s. 829 (1989). 
215. [d. at 830. 
216. [d. at 834. 
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regulations at issue p'rovided that benefits would be denied to an 
applicant refusing suitable work without good cause. This is im-
portant because later cases have explained that heightened re-
view was warranted based on the fact that the "good cause" 
standard "invited consideration of the particular circumstances" 
of each case.217 Suffice it to say for our purposes here that be-
cause the "necessity" standard incorporated in Ordinance No. 
87 -52 and Ordinance No. 87-71 would seem to require an analo-
gous determination, an argument can be made that strict scru-
tiny should be extended beyond the context of the unemploy-
ment compensation cases. Discussion of this matter is 
appropriately postponed. 
Moreover, the fact that in each of the respective cases the 
Court emphasized the lack of evidence supporting the state's as-
serted interest is also important. This emphasis is important be-
cause Hialeah presents a comparable situation, and thus further 
supports an argument that the Hialeah ordinances are inconsis-
tent with the Free Exercise Clause. 
2. The Tax Cases 
The Court's concern for government. autonomy is perhaps 
nowhere more apparent than in the area of tax regulations, 
where, with the exception of cases in which the challenged regu-
lation effectively operated as a prior restraint,218 most claims 
have failed. 
In United States v. Lee,218 the plaintiff, a member of the 
Old Order Amish, challenged the constitutionality of the imposi-
tion of social security taxes. Specifically, the plaintiff, who 
owned a small carpentry shop, refused to file quarterly social se-
curity tax returns, withhold social security tax from his employ-
ees, or pay his social security taxes. The Court, while recognizing 
that compulsory participation in the social security system inter-
fered with the plaintiff's religious beliefs, rejected the plaintiff's 
free exercise challenge. The Court reasoned that the govern-
217. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), reh'g denied, 
496 U.S. 913 (1990). 
218. See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943). 
219. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
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ment's interest in maintaining the social security system, and in 
particular mandatory participation in the system, was para-
mount to the plaintiff's interest in the free exercise of the Amish 
faith.220 "Because the social security system is nationwide," the 
Court explained, "the government interest is apparent."221 
In Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,222 
members of the Church of Scientology brought suit against the 
government claiming that regulations prohibiting deductions for 
"training" sessions (meetings between participants and Church 
officials intended. to enhance spiritual awareness) violated the 
Free Exercise Clause.223 The Court recognized that the regula-
tions imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion. Notwithstanding this determination, however, the Court 
rejected the plaintiffs' claim. The Court again reasoned that the 
government's interest in maintaining the tax system was supe-
rior to the plaintiffs' interest in the free exercise of 
, Scientology.224 
Most notably, for the purpose of generally applicable tax 
regulations, the Court appears to have recently abandoned the 
compelling interest test applied in Lee and Hernandez in 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization.22& There, 
suit was filed after the State Board of Equalization info,rmed the 
plaintiff, a religious organization, that religious materials it was 
selling were not exempt from state sales tax. The Court, devel-
oping the distinction between a "flat license tax" (potentially 
constituting a prior restraint) and a "flat sales tax" (which do 
not), rejected the challenge.226 Emphasizing that the tax "merely 
decreased the amount of money the plaintiff had to spend on 
religious activities," a unanimous Court held that the burden 
imposed on the plaintiff's free exercise of religion was not "con-
220. Id. at 258-59. The Court concluded further that an exemption would "unduly 
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest." Id. at 259 (quoting Braunfted v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961». 
221. Id.}~.t 258 (emphasis added). 
222. 490 U.S. 680 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 933 (1989). 
223. The plaintiffs claimed that they should be allowed to deduct the fee charged 
for training sessions as a charitable deduction. 
224. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 698-700. 
225. 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
226. See id. at 385-90. 
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stitutionally significant."227 The respective decisions suggest that 
absent the situation where a given tax regulation can be charac-
terized as a prior restraint, free exercise review is inappropriate. 
But the cases are also important because, from a jurisprudential 
perspective, they serve to illustrate the proposition that free ex-
ercise cases are resolved mainly with reference to the competing 
interests at issue. Simply put, the Court has determined that the 
government's interest in maintaining the financial integrity of 
the nationwide tax system outweighs most, if not all, burdens on 
religious conduct. 
3. Criminal Prohibitions 
While the Court's jurisprudence with respect to the unem-
ployment compensation and tax cases has been consistent, the 
same cannot be said where criminal prohibitions have been con-
cerned. Perhaps this may be explained by the fact that there are 
extremely strong interests on both sides. But the shift in Court 
personnel during the period discussed below is also important. 
This shift in Court personnel was accompanied by what we now 
know was a corresponding shift in free exercise doctrine as well. 
Following Reynolds, the first significant case raising ques-
tions regarding the validity of criminal prohibitions burdening 
the free exercise of religion was Cantwell v. Connecticut,228 de-
cided in 1940. There, the plaintiffs, Jehovah's witnesses, were ar-
rested for soliciting religious contributions (by going house to 
house and playing an anti-Catholic record for willing listeners) 
without having first obtained the requisite state certificate;229 
The Court reversed the convictions. While sensitive to the 
State's interest in preserving both the public peace and the pub-
lic order ,230 the Court held that the certification requirement 
227. [d. at 391. 
228. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
229. The plaintiffs, Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russel, were also 
arrested for committing a breach of the peace, this charge also stemming from their 
house to house solicitation. 
230. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306-07. Language in the opinion reveals that the Court, 
while willing to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs, was clearly sensitive to the State's 
interest in maintaining order. "Nothing we have said," cautioned the Court, "is intended 
even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, 
commit frauds upon the public. Certainly penal laws are available to punish such con-
duct." [d. at 306. And perhaps most revealing is the Court's statement that "Even the 
exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that the State may 
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posed a "forbidden burden" on the plaintiffs' free exercise of 
religion.231 
Notably, the Court did not specifically discuss the issue of 
whether the challenged regulation could be justified by a com-
pelling interest. The latter portion of the Court's opinion, how-
ever, suggests that the Court was in fact applying heightened 
review. The decision, speaking of "narrowly drawn" statutes and 
"substantial" state interests,232 is thus significant because it sig-
naled an important development in the Court's free exercise ju-
risprudence: the arrival of strict scrutiny.233 
The next major case appears to have been Braunfeld v. 
Brown,234 which followed roughly twenty years later. There, or-
thodox Jewish merchants challenged Sunday closing laws argu-
ing that because their religious beliefs prohibited Saturday work, 
the laws impaired their ability to "earn a livelihood."2311 The 
Court rejected the challenge. This time expressly applying 
heightened scrutiny, the Court held the regulation was justified 
by the State's interest in providing a general day of rest.236 The 
decision's significance was thus twofold. On the one hand the 
Court recognized heightened review as established doctrine; on 
. the other, that heightened review would not always be fatal to 
legislation. 
A decade later, the Court again addressed this issue in Wis-
consin v. Yoder,237 where Amish parents challenged their convic-
tion under a State statute requiring compulsory school attend-
ance.238 The Court acknowledged the strength of the State's 
protect its citizens from injury." Id. 
231. Id: at 307. 
232. Id. at 311. 
233. The Court's emphasis on the absence of evidence that the plaintiffs' conduct 
posed any threat to the public good is additionally important. See id. at 310. The signifi-
cance of this aspect of the opinion is discussed infra notes 253-62 and accompanying 
text. 
234. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Warren authored the 
opinion. He was joined by Justices Black, Clark and Whittaker. 
235. Id!...at 601. 
236. Id. at 607 ("we cannot find a State without the power to provide a weekly res-
pite from aU labor"). 
237. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
238. The Wisconsin statute provided that children were required to attend school 
until the age of 16. The plaintiffs, Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller and Adin Yutz, refused to 
enroll their children after they completed the eighth grade, and were subsequently fined 
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interest in universal education. However, the Court held that the 
State had failed to adduce sufficient evidence in support of its 
position. The Court observed specifically that there was no "ba-
sis in the record to warrant a finding that an additional one or 
two years of formal school education beyond the eighth grade 
would serve to eliminate any such problems as might exist."239 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the convictions. 
Together the Court's decisions reveal that criminal prohibi-
tions burdening the free exercise of religion trigger heightened 
review. This much is plain to see. More importantly, though, the 
Court's decisions reflect the fundamental tension which has 
shaped the Court's free exercise jurisprudence: tension between 
the need to promot~ the free exercise of religion and the need to 
preserve government autonomy, and tension between formal 
neutrality and accommodation. 
D. NEUTRALITY AND THE SMITH DECISION 
The Court's Smith decision represents a dramatic, though 
not entirely unexpected,240 departure from the Court's tradi-
$5 each pursuant to the statute. 
239. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224. 
240. In Yoder, the Court was already discussing the concept of neutrality. There, 
the Court expressly declared that "[a) regulation neutral on its face may, in its applica-
tion, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it 
unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." 406 U.S. at 220. And while the Court ulti-
mately disregarded this language in Smith, the neutrality argument was clearly begin-
ning to gather support when the Court decided Bowen v. Roy in 1986. The plurality 
there observed that "a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face is of a wholly 
different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition .... " 476 U.S. 
at 704. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 723 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (When "a State has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to 
advance the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not ... require that the 
State conform that statute to the dictates of religious conscience of any group.") (cited in 
McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra note 5, at 1417-18); United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (There "is virtually no room for a 'constitu-
tionally required exemption' on religious grounds from a valid ... law that is entirely 
neutral in its general application.") (cited in McConnel, Origins of Free Exercise, supra 
note 5, at 1418); but see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("[G)overnment [may) take religion into account ... to· exempt, when possible, 
from generally applicable government regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and 
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an 
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.") (cited in McConnel, Ac-
commodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 688). 
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tional free exercise jurisprudence.241 Regardless of whether the 
Court was applying a watered-down version of the compelling 
interest test before Smith was decided,242 most free exercise 
claims at least triggered heightened review. Yet from the Court's 
"long history of free exercise precedents," the Smith majority 
extracted the single categorical rule that generally applicable 
neutral laws regulating religious conduct do not impose a cogni-
zableburden on the exercise of religion.243 
Briefly, in Smith, the plaintiffs, Native. Americans, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of an Oregon law prohibiting the use 
of peyote. Both plaintiffs were fired from their positions at a 
drug rehabilitation clinic for ingesting the hallucinogen at a Na-
tive American Church ceremony. Suit was filed shortly after the 
State denied their claim for unemployment benefits . 
. 241. See, e.g., American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. United States, 951 F.2d 
957,960 (9th Cir. 1991) (Smith "dramatically altered the manner in which we must eval-
uate free exercise" claims). Professor McConnel similarly suggests that while "there was 
no shortage of free exercise cases or closely divided opinions," free exercise doctrine was 
relatively stable before Smith. McConnel, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 14, at 
1109.· He suggests further that after Smith, "[fjree exercise is no longer wanting for con-
troversy." Id. at 1111. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Smith directly supports 
this conclusion. There, he remarked that the Court's holding "effectuate[dJ a wholesale 
overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clause .... " Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 908 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). And Justice O'Connor, while concurring in the majority opinion, was insensitive 
to these developments. Describing the result reached by the majority as "sweeping," she 
was highly critical of both the Court's "strained reading of the First Amendment" and 
disregard for established precedent. Id. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
The considerable commentary generated in response to the Court's decision further 
attests to its significance. See generally Laycock, Summary and Synthesis, supra note 
31, at 841 (1992) ("Smith creates the legal framework for persecution."); Douglas Lay-
cock, The Supreme Court's Assault On Free Exercise, And The Amicus Brief That Was 
Never Filed, 8 J.L. & REL. 99 (1990) ("The opinion appears to be inconsistent with the 
original intent, inconsistent with the constitutional text, inconsistent with the doctrine 
under the constitutional clauses, and inconsistent with precedent. It strips the free exer-
cise clause of independent meaning."); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and 
Free Exercise Revi~ionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Michael W. McConnel, A Re-
sponse to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1991); McConnel, Free Exercise 
Revisionism, supra note 14. And for an interesting discussion of the Smith decision from 
a cultural perspective, see The Supreme· Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitu-
tional Law (1990) (arguing that Native Americans have suffered at the expense of'the 
Court's free exercise jurisprudence). 
242. See McConnel, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 14, at 1109. 
243. Smith, 494 U.S. at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor challenged 
this aspect of the majority's holding. She countered that "[tJhere is nothing talismanic 
about neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neu-
tral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude 
upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion." Id. at 901. 
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Emphasizing that the regulation was neutral and generally 
applicable, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim without sub-
jecting the challenged regulation to even minimal scrutiny.244 
The Court explained that the Sherbert' compelling interest test 
was "inapplicable," Justice Scalia reasoning that "[t]o make an 
individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the 
law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the 
State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of 
his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself' - contradicts both 
constitutional tradition lmd common sense."246 
The Court's holding in' Smith thus stands for the proposi-
tion that generally applicable neutral laws effectively regulating 
religious conduct do not trigger constitutional scrutiny.246 Ac-
244. See generally id. at 883-90. 
245. [d. at 885 (citations omitted). In rejecting the argument that the Court should 
apply strict scrutiny, Justice Scalia attempted to distinguish Smith from Sherbert and 
its progeny. Specifically, he explained that the Sherbert test "was developed in a context 
that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant 
conduct." [d. at 884. He E!xplained further that "a distinctive feature of unemployment 
compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the partic-
ular circumstances .... " The good cause standard created a mechanism for individual-
ized exemptions.' " [d. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
Justice Scalia also attempted to distinguish cases applying strict scrutiny not involv-
ing unemployment compensation regulations, such as Wisconsin v. Yoder and Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, from Smith. He did so by characterizing these opinions as "hybrid" deci-
sions, raising more than one constitutional claim. "The only decisions in which we have 
held'that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to 
religiously motivated actions have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the 
Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such freedom 
of speech and of the press, or the right of parents ... to direct the education of their 
children." [d. at 881. He further acknowledged that cases involving "not the Free Exer-
cise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections," might be subject to different treatment. [d. at 881-82. 
Justice O'Connor was highly critical of this argument. She maintained rather that 
there was "no denying that both [Cantwell and Yoder] expressly relied on the Free Exer-
cise Clause." [d. at 896 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations ·omitted). 
246. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; see also Respondent's Brief at 10, Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd 
without op., 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.Ct. 1472 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter "Respondent's Brief']; Petitioner's Brief at 11, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd without op., 936 F.2d 
586 (11th Cir. 19~H), cert. granted, 112 S.Ct. 1472 (1992) [hereinafter "Petitioner's 
Brief']. The Church also advanced two other interpretations of the Court's holding. 
First, that "laws specifically directed at a litigant's religious practices are subject to 
stringent review." Petitioner's Brief at 11. Second, that "if the legality of a regulated act 
depends upon the actor's motives, religious motives must be included among the motives 
that are legally permitted." [d. 
The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only federal circuit court having interpreted the 
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cordingly, because no further inquiry is necessary if the chal-
lenged regulation is characterized in this manner, Smith, like 
Lyng, reinforces the importance of the cognizable claim inquiry. 
The precise scope of the Court's holding, however, is unclear. 
Neutrality served as the cornerstone for the majority's analysis. 
Yet the opinion offers little guidance regarding the substance of 
the distinction between neutral laws and laws targeting particu-
lar religious practices.247 The Court most likely granted certio-
rari in Hialeah to address specifically this concern. 
The Court's decision is also important because, while the 
opinion suggests that heightened scrutiny is properly limited to 
the context of the unemployment compensation cases,248 the 
Court did not expressly make this determination. Rather, the 
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim without proceeding to resolve 
the issue of whether the Oregon statute served a compelling in-
terest. After Smith, the question of whether a criminal prohibi-
tion regulating religious conduct targeting particular religious 
practices is still subject to heightened review thus remains un-
resolved. Hialeah will probably address this issue as well. 
Additionally important is language in the majority's opinion 
reflecting the Court's troubling interpretation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. One passage in the opinion is particularly revealing. 
In explaining why granting an exemption for the religious use of 
peyote was improper, Justice Scalia declared that: 
[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommoda-
tion to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government must be pre-
significance of the Court's Smith decision to date. The court's interpretation, however, 
similarly supports this conclusion. In American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. 
United States, 951 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1991), the plaintiffs, a Quaker organization employ-
ing approximately 400 persons, brought suit against the government claiming that provi-
sions of the Immigration Reform Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(I), requiring, gener-
ally, that employers verify the legal immigration status of their employees, violated the 
free exercise clause. After determining that Smith was controlling, the court rejected the 
claim. The court reasoned that the regulations were "not aimed at suppressing the free 
exercise of religion," and were thus valid under Smith. [d. at 961. 
247. The Court's failure to do so is probably explained by the fact that the Oregon 
regulation was not challenged as an attempt to regulate religious beliefs. Smith, 494· U.S. 
at 882. 
248. See id. at 882-86. 
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ferred to a system in which each conscience is a 
law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all 
religious beliefs.249 
639 
This language is troubling, because it signals the Court's return 
to formal neutrality,ZIiO which, Professor McConnel reminds us, 
"confines protection of the Free Exercise Clause to persecution 
or overt discrimination against religion," and thus has little 
practical significance.2111 Whether formal neutrality will continue 
to prevail in Hialeah will be an issue of significant interest. 
V. RITUAL ANIMAL SACRIFICE AND THE FUTURE OF 
FREE EXERCISE: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
Hialeah squarely raises two of the fundamental free exercise 
questions which remain unresolved in the wake of the Court's 
Smith decision. The first, concerning the precise substance of 
the neutrality assessment, is essentially an evidentiary issue: 
whether Smith contemplates the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence, or whether facial neutrality should be dispositive. The 
second, and perhaps more fundamental, is whether free exercise 
claims will continue to trigger heightened scrutiny. This section 
explores the significance of these questions, both in the abstract 
and specifically with respect to Hialeah. 
As a preliminary matter, we turn to a brief discussion re-
garding the need to reinstate the specific evidence requirement 
given voice in Wisconsin u. Yoderm and the unemployment 
compensation cases. We begin here, because this requirement 
249. [d. at 890 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor expressly challenged this conclu-
sion in her concurring opinion. She emphasized in particular that "[oJne's right to life, 
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship aqd assembly, and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of 
no elections." [d. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Professor McConnel similarly adds that 
"[tJhe 'disadvantaging' of minority religions is not 'unavoidable' if the courts are doing 
their job. Avoiding certain 'consequences' of democratic government is ordinarily 
thought to be the very purpose of the Bill of Rights." McConnel, Free Exercise Revision-
ism, supra note 14, at 1129. 
250. Whether the free exercise clause should in fact be given a broad or narrow 
interpretation is one of the issues raised by the Court's Smith decision. See McConnel, 
Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 14, at 1111. 
251. McConnel, Accommodation of Religion, supra note 24, at 691. 
252. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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should play an important role in Hialeah. 
A. THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC EVIDENCE 
In his dissenting opinion in Smith, Justice Blackmun 
stressed both that the plaintiffs' claim triggered free exercise re-
view and that Oregon's prohibition against the use of peyote was 
invalid.2l1s With regard to the latter, Justice Blackmun empha-
sized' that "evidence the religious use of peyote ever harmed 
anyone" was absent.2114 Yet while the "dearth of evidence"21111 was 
important to Justice Blackmun, the Court's decisions do not 
clearly reveal whether or not the state must furnish "specific evi-
deI).ce"21!6 in support of assertedly compelling interests. 
Several decisions suggest that such evidence is required. In 
Yoder, for example, the Court sustained the plaintiffs' free exer-
cise claim reasoning specifically that the State's evidence was in-
sufficient.21!7 The unemployment compensation cases were simi-
larly sensitive to this concern.2118 But elsewhere, specific evidence 
has not been required. Thus, in Prince v. Massachusetts 2119 the 
Court sustained the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the 
distribution of religious literature by children despite the ab-
sence of evidence of any danger to "the state or to the health, 
morals or welfare of the child. "260 
Even after Smith, this issue remains yet unresolved. How-
ever, the answer would seem to be clear. The Court should rein-
state the specific evidence requirement in order to safeguard 
against the possibility that mere pretense will serve to justify 
religious discrimination.261 "Religious freedom," Justice Murphy 
253. See generally 494 U.S. 872, 911-12 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 912 n.4. 
256. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224. 
257. Id. 
258. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Frazee v. Illinois, 484 
U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981). 
259. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
260. Id. at 174 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
261. The Court has sanctioned this concern in a related context. For example, in 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 178 (1982), the Court sustained an 
equal protection challenge to the State's policy of excluding men from the Mississippi 
University for Women School of Nursing reasoning that "although the State recited a 
'benign compensatory purpose,' it failed to establish that the alleged objective is the 
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once declared, "is too sacred a right to be restricted or prohib-
ited in any degree without convincing proof that a legitimate 
interest of the state is in grave danger."262 
B. NEUTRALITY 
1. Analysis 
Prior to Smith, the Court's free exercise jurisprudence ap-
peared to be well settled: regulations imposing a substantial bur-
den on the free exercise of religious conduct triggered constitu-
tional scrutiny. Today, however, this may no longer be the 
case.263 Even where the substantial burden requirement is satis-
fied, free exercise review may no longer be necessary. 
The Court's opinion poses an interesting problem. From an 
evidentiary perspective, the opinion is susceptible to two inter-
pretations. The first, advanced by the City, is that facial neutral-
ity is dispositive.264 Courts, in other words, may not look beyond, 
statutory language. The second, advanced by the Church, is that 
neutrality can be assessed with reference to extrinsic evidence.26G 
For the purpose of Hialeah, this interpretation would sanction 
consideration of both the legislature's motives and dominant ef-
fect of the challenged regulations. Arguably, the latter interpre-
tation should prevail. 
Because neutral generally applicable laws do not have to be 
justified by a compelling interest,266 neutrality represents a fun-
damental threshold inquiry. Recognizing this, it becomes clear 
actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification." [d. at 730. Writing for the 
majority, Justice O'Connor emphasized in particular that the State had made "no show-
ing that women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain' 
positions of leadership in that field when the [University] opened its doors or that 
women currently are deprived of such opportunities." [d. at 731. 
262. Prince, 321 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added). 
263. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text revealing that the Court will 
now look to the form as well as severity of the burden. 
264. Respondent's Brief at 11 ("The language of the ordinances should be 
definitive. "). . 
265. See Petitioner's Brief at 12-14 ("Two of the ordinance overtly discriminate 
against religion. All of them were enacted for the sole purpose of suppressing a religious 
practice, and that is almost their only effect. All of them recognize good and bad reasons 
for killing animals, and classify religious reasons as bad."). 
266. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.S. 
913 (1990). 
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that the fate of the Free Exercise Clause hinges largely on how 
neutrality is to be defined.267 If given an expansive definition, 
few claims will continue to trigger free exercise review.268 "[F]ew 
states," Justice O'Connor observed in her concurring opinion in 
Smith, "would be so naive as to enact laws directly prohibiting 
or burdening religious practices as such."269 Conversely, a nar-
row definition would serve to rejuvenate, or at least restore, the 
viability of the Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Given that 
Smith has led to the "near and total loss of any substantive con-
stitutional right to practice religion,"27o the latter interpretation 
would appear to be more consistent with the deep logic underly-
ing the First Amendment. "As the language of the "Clause itself 
makes clear, an individual's free exercise of religion is a pre-
ferred constitutional activity. "271 
This interpretation would also be more consistent with es-
tablished precedent. In Roy, for example, the Court, while 
speaking to' this concern, considered evidence that "Congress 
made no provision for individual exemptions to the requirement 
in the two statutes in question."272 And in a related context the 
Court has counseled that "[d]etermining whether invidious dis-
criminatory purposes [are] a motivating factor demands a sensi-
tive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may 
be available."273 
2. Application 
The district court rejected the Church's free exercise claim 
267. Indeed, as observed by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Smith, 
the "free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect 
of significantly burdening a religious practice." [d. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added). 
268. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 11 ("Smith leaves precious little protection for 
the free exercise of religion. If this Court permits even that protection to be evaded by 
cleuer drafting and a mere pretense of neutrality, then it has indeed repea1ed the Free 
Exercise Clause.") (emphasis added). 
269. 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also generally Fowler v. Rhode 
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 256 (1886). 
270. Laycock, Summary and Synthesis, supra note 31, at 848. 
271. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
272. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986). 
273. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977) (emphasis original). 
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reasoning that the ordinances were intended to prohibit all 
animal sacrifice rather than to target specifically the practice of 
Santeria.274 Even assuming, however, that facial neutrality is 
dispositive, the challenged regulations are not neutral. 
Facial neutrality provides a useful point of departure. Each 
ordinance is laden with terms having religiou's significance. For 
example, the ordinances are replete with textual references to 
"sacrifice," "ritual" and "ceremony." If the ordinances are truly 
neutral, these references must serve a secular purpose. But they 
do not. The City claimed the use of these terms was intended to 
place residents of Hialeah on notice of the prohibited conduct.27Ci 
In light of the fact that the City failed to introduce evidence 
that animals are killed in secular rituals or ceremonies, the 
City's argument amounts to a tacit admission that terms such as 
"sacrifice" are largely synonymous with religion.276 Given that 
the statutory language is directed at religious practices, it fol-
lows that the ordinances target primarily the religious practice 
of animal sacrifice, and thus cannot properly be characterized as 
neutral. The district court implicitly reached this conclusion 
when it explained that an exemption "would, in effect, swallow 
the rule."277 For, after all, the court's reluctance to grant a reli-
gious exception can only be explained by the fact that "the rule 
has only religious applications. "278 
The absence of the requisite neutrality also becomes appar-
ent when extrinsic evidence is considered. To begin with, the 
district court expressly found that the Church's announcement 
"triggered" the legislative action.279 This evidence is not, of 
course, dispositive. However, it at least supports an inference of 
anti-religious intent.28o 
274. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1488 
(S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd without op., 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 
1472 (1992). 
275. Respondent's Brief at 13. 
276. See, e.g., Petitioner's Reply Brief at 41, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd without op., 936 F.2d 586 
(11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992) [hereinafter "Petitioner's Reply 
Brief'). 
277. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1487. 
278. Petitioner's Brief at 16. 
279. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1483. 
280. E.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 ("specific sequence of events leading 
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's 
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Also revealing is the fact that Hialeah recognizes a broad 
range of acceptable secular killings. For example, Hialeah per-
mits the extermination of "undesirable" animals.281 These ex-
ceptions strongly suggest that "suppression of religion is virtu-
ally the only effect of the ordinances."282 The Church correctly 
points out that "[a]ny resident of Hialeah can kill an unwanted 
pet in his yard or home, so long as he does not do so in a ritual 
or ceremony." Again, while relevant, this evidence is probably 
not dispositive. But taken together, this evidence reveals that 
the ordinances are not neutral and, accordingly, that the chal-
lenged regulations are properly subject to the compelling inter-
est test.283 
Also militating in favor of heightened review is the fact that 
Santeria is an "underground," or minority, religion.284 The First 
Amendment, in recognition that "[n]o chapter in human history 
has been so largely written in terms of persecution and intoler-
ance as the ones dealing with religious freedom,"281i contem-
purpose"). 
281. See FLA. STAT. § 482.021(17) (West 1987), incorporated into HIALEAH ORD. 87-
40 (1987). Ordinance No. 87-40 also effectively incorporated a myriad of other exemp-
tions. See generally Petitioner's Brief at 12-13. 
282. Petitioner's Brief at 11. 
283. Heightened review would also seemingly be compelled by the fact that the ordi-
nances fail to provide for a religious exception. In Smith, the Court observed that Sher-
bert and its progeny stand for the proposition that "where the State has in place a sys-
tem of individualized exceptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases or 
'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 494 U.S. at 884. There is, however, a 
slight problem here. While the Court did not determine whether strict scrutiny was 
properly limited to the context of the unemployment cases, the Court did expressly de-
clare that "these decisions at least have nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal 
prohibition on a particular form of conduct." [d. Implicitly, Smith would thus appear to 
preclude consideration of evidence of this nature at this stage of the inquiry. The ques-
tion becomes one of interpretation. If the Court intended to articulate an evidentiary 
restriction, evidence that the City provides for secular but not religious exemptions 
would be inadmissible. Arguably, though, this was not the Court's purpose. This passage 
appears in the portion of the opinion where the Court was distinguishing Smith from the 
unemployment compensation cases. Hence, the Court was not focusing on the substance 
of the neutrality assessment, but rather on the standard of review question. See id. As-
suming this interpretation is correct, heightened review would appear to be required. 
284. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text discussing the historical origins 
of Santeria. . 
285. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 175 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting); see 
also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 ("historical instances of religious persecution and 
intolerance gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause"); United States 
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("The Fathers of the Constitution were not una.ware of 
the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among 
them, and of the lack of anyone religious creed on which all men would agree. They 
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plates free exercise· of just this character.286 Indeed, "[t]he very 
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subject 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as le-
gal principles to be applied by the courts."287 Heightened review 
is required if the Court is to remain faithful to these 
principles.288 
C. HEIGHTENED REVIEW AFTER SMITH? 
1. Analysis 
Justice Scalia's Smith OpInIOn strongly suggests that the 
Sherbert compelling interest test should properly be limited to 
the context of the unemployment compensation decisions.289 
The Court, however, did not specifically address this question, 
and thus the precise issue of whether criminal prohibitions bur-
dening the free exercise of religious conduct are properly subject 
to heightened scrutiny remains unresolved. Providing the chal-
lenged regulations are not characterized as neutral and generally 
applicable, the Court will now have to confront this question in 
Hialeah. 290 Contrary to Justice Scalia's suggested conclusion in 
Smith, heightened review is arguably appropriate.291 Indeed, 
Smith itself compels this conclusion. 
fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration of con-
flicting views."). 
286. "[T)he First Amendment was enacted to protect the rights of those whose reli-
gious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility." Smith, 
494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
287. [d. at 903 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
638 (1943)). 
288. "The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment's mandate of pre-
serving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society." [d. 
289. See id. at 882-86. 
290. Because the challenged regulations provide for criminal sanctions, the cogniza-
ble burden requirement should not present a serious issue. Criminal prohibitions burden 
the individual's free exercise of religion in the "severest manner possible." Smith, 494 
U.S. at 898 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cem~tery Pro-
tective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). 
291. In their separate opinions in Smith, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Black-
mun similarly reached this conclusion. 
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2. Application 
In Smith, the majority highlighted the fact that the Sher-
bert test was developed in a context where consideration of the 
"particular circumstances" was necessary.292 More importantly, 
the majority distinguished Smith from Sherbert based expressly 
on this distinctive feature of the unemployment programs. Simi-
lar considerations serve to distinguish Hialeah from Smith. Or-
dinance No. 87-52 and Ordinance No. 87-71 prohibit the "un-
necessary" killing of animals.293 In this respect, the challenged 
ordinances are analogous to the unemployment compensation 
regulations: both 'standards require a fact-intensive inquiry. Ac-
c'ordingly, the rationale serving to justify heightened scrutiny in 
Sherbert extends to Hialeah, and heightened review is therefore 
appropriate. 
The more difficult question is, perhaps, whether assuming 
that the ordinances are not neutral, the ban on animal sacrifice 
can be justified by any of the three interests asserted by the 
City. Arguably, the ban cannot be justified. 
a. Community Health, Welfare and Safety 
For the better part of a century, the Court has recognized 
that under the police power, states have authority to enact regu-
lations to protect "the public health and the public safety."294 
Thus, there is some credence to the City's argument here. Yet 
the absence of evidence that animal sacrifice poses such a threat 
is fatal to the City's claim. The trial court found that "[t]he evi-
dence at trial revealed a risk of physical harm to members of 
both the [Church] and the public from disease and infesta-
tion."291i However, the Court also found that prior to trial, "no 
instances [had been] documented of any infectious disease 
originating from the remains of animals being left in public 
292. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986). 
293. See HIALEAH ORD. § 87-52, 6-8(2) (1987); HIALEAH ORD. § 87-71(1) (1987). 
294. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 
872 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1978); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
295. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 
1485 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd without op., 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 
S. Ct. 1472 (1992). 
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places."296 This is precisely the constitutional infirmity identi-
fied in Yoder297 and consistently highlighted in the unemploy-
ment compensation cases.298 
b. Psychological Welfare of Children 
The Court has long recognized that the states have a strong 
interest in looking after the welfare of minor children. In Prince, 
for example, the Court held that this interest outweighed the 
right of parents to use their children as street proselytizers for 
their faith. 299 This concern also led the Court to conclude in Je-
hovah's Witnesses v. King County HospitalSoo that parents 
could not, on religious grounds, withhold a blood transfusion 
from their child where necessary to save the child's life. And the 
Court has similarly expressed concern for the welfare of children 
in other areas. SOl Although most cases have involved principally 
threats of physical harm, the Court has expressly validated con-
cern for the psychological welfare of children. 302 
Yet while the City's interest here is clearly viable, there is, 
again, the troubling lack of any specific evidence in support of 
the City's position. Evidence that children are permitted to at-
tend sacrificial ceremonies was proffered.303 But no evidence was 
offered documenting expert testimony that witnessing animal 
sacrifice would tend to promote aggressive behavior. To the con-
trary, the City's expert "did not testify that observation of vio-
lence would lead inalterably to violent behavior; just that such 
296. [d. at 1474 (emphasis added). 
297. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224. 
298. See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text. 
299. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944). The Court explained 
that "[al democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into full mature citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this 
against the impending restraints and dangers, within a broad range of selection." [d. at 
168. 
300. 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam). 
301. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the FCC could properly consider whether unsupervised children 
would be exposed to potentially offensive radio broadcasts for regulatory purposes); Fer-
ber v. New York, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982). 
302. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 170 (propagandizing may create possible emo-
tional, psychological or physical injury). 
303. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1474 n. 24. 
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observation was more likely to promote such behavior."s04 More-
over, the City's expert appears simply to have been 
speculating. SOli . 
c. Animal Cruelty 
The district court, relying on expert testimony that proce-
dures used by the Church for maintaining and killing sacrificial 
animals were inhumane, concluded that the ban could be justi-
fied by the City's interest in the prevention of animal cruelty.sos 
This portion of the court's holding is also without merit. Admit-
tedly, prevention of animal cruelty is a legitimate interest. But 
plainly this interest is not compelling. A single analogy is suffi-
cient to demonstrate why. In Yoder, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the compulsory school-attendance law at issue could 
be justified by the State's interest in universal education. S07 As a 
matter of common sense, the City's interest in preventing 
animal cruelty cannot be paramount to Wisconsin's interest in 
promoting universal education, "education perhaps the most im-
portant function of state and local governments."S08 As recently 
explained by Justice Scalia in Smith, "if 'compelling interest' re-
ally means what it says, . . . many laws will not meet the 
test."S09 
Even assuming these interests are compelling, the ordi-
nances would still be unconstitutional. To justify the ordinances, 
the City also had to prove that its asserted interests could not be 
"otherwise served."slo Suffice it to say that the City could ac-
complish its objectives by prohibiting the improper disposal of 
animal remains - that is, of course, unless the practice of 
304. Id. at 1475. 
305. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text discussing Dr. Huesmann's 
testimony. 
306. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1486-87. 
307. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text. 
308. San Antonio School Dist. v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 15 (1973) (quoting Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954» (emphasis added); see also Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (education plays a "fundamental role in maintaining the fabric 
of our society"). 
309. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990), reh'g denied, 496 U.s. 913 
(1990) (emphasis added). Of course the Court did recognize Pennsylvania's interest in 
providing a uniform day of rest as compelling in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 
(1961) (plurality opinion). See supra notes 234-36. 
310. Wisconsin v. Yode~, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). See also supra note 10. 
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Santeria is what the ordinances really target. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Hialeah, the Court will have to confront several difficult 
free exercise issues raised, but not resolved, by Smith. In partic-
ular, resolution of the question of whether facial neutrality will 
be dispositive under Smith will be of considerable significance. 
More importantly, though, Hialeah will now call on the Court to 
decide whether disadvantaging minority religious practices, like 
Santeria, is, in fact, an "unavoidable consequence"311 of demo-
cratic government. Hialeah, in other words, involves nothing 
short of the fate of free exercise. 
Rod M. Fliegel* 
311. 'Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (emphasis added). 
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